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Introduction 
Scientific consensus tells us that the problem of climate change is 
unambiguously a global one, and one that intertwines environmental, economic, 
and social issues on a scale unmet by humanity.1  What does this mean for 
policymakers facing such an unprecedented issue?  Conventional wisdom and the 
general consensus dictate that “climate change is a global problem requiring a 
concerted global response.”2  Indeed, many scholars assert that the scale of the 
solution should match the scale of the problem.3  However, as global greenhouse 
gas emissions increase at a rapid rate,4 climate change policymaking at the 
international level has failed to keep pace. 
Climate change science underscores the argument for international climate 
change policymaking.  To begin with, climate change presents a complicated 
scenario with no singular bad actor.5  Carbon dioxide emissions and other 
tropospheric aerosols permit solar energy to reach the Earth’s surface but trap 
heat energy radiating back from the surface, resulting in increased temperatures.6  
Moreover, today’s increasing temperatures are the result of a previous generation’s 
emissions, and so today’s emissions mean a commitment to increased warming in 
the future.7   
However, if we wait for an international treaty, our climate system is in danger 
as the effects of climate change intensify.  In response to the lack of progress at the 
international level, many local policymakers and individuals are tackling the issue 
from the “bottom-up.”  On one side of the policy debate, scholars argue that local 
action is a practicable approach to fight climate change.8  On the other side, some 
scholars argue that “subnational state-level action is not the best way to combat 
global climate change . . . because local action is not well suited to regulating 
 
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Solomon et al. eds., 2007) available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf [hereinafter IPCC] 
(explaining the causes of climate change, the current state of the science, and projected impacts). 
2. Daniel A. Farber, Carbon Leakage versus Policy Diffusion: The Perils and Promise of Subglobal 
Climate Action, 13 CHI. J. INT'L L. 359, 360 (2012) (citing, for example, Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. 
Saleska, The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 187 (2005) (“endorsing the need for 
global action by advocates of state climate regulation”)). 
3. Id. at 361 (citing Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: 
The Case for Reallocating Federal Authority, 14 YALE J. L. & POLY. REV. 23, 35 (1996)). 
4. IPCC, supra note 1, at 2. 
5. See generally id. (explaining the human and natural causes of climate change). 
6. Id. at 3-4. 
7. Id. at 12-15. 
8. See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change 
Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409 (2008) (arguing that local actors combating climate change are a 
viable response to effective policymaking). 
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mobile global conduct yielding a global externality.”9  With both of these scholarly 
arguments in mind, this paper asserts that transnational networks, comprised of 
policymakers, organizations, and individuals collaborating to combat climate 
change, can debunk the critics’ arguments, achieve global scale, and become the 
successful global solution to this unprecedented global problem. 
Section I presents the conventional, “top-down” approach to climate change 
policy.  In this part, I briefly examine the extent to which international and federal 
policymakers (in the context of the United States) have dealt with the issue and 
conclude that they have failed.  Against this backdrop, Section II addresses the 
critics.  In this part, I briefly describe the arguments in favor of a global regime 
and the limits of local efforts, and by implication, transnational networks.  Section 
III illustrates how bottom-up policymakers have come to address climate change.  
In this part, I examine key successes at the state-level and local-level of 
policymaking.  Section IV explores the emergence of transnational networks and 
illustrates their positive contributions to climate change policy.  In order to better 
understand how transnational networks can debunk the conventional wisdom that 
a global problem requires a global solution, section V highlights social interaction 
theory and research in support of transnational networks’ viability.  Finally, 
Section VI identifies the values that transnational networks espouse.  Based on 
these values, this paper concludes that the power of transnational networks cannot 
be rejected while we wait for a global regime. 
I. Waiting for a Treaty: The Failure of Top-Down Climate 
Change Policies 
How did the global issue of climate change become a local problem?  To better 
understand the emergence of local actors combating climate change and the 
formation of transnational networks, this section provides an overview of the 
traditional, top-down attempts to address climate change, and concludes that the 
top-down approach has failed because of the competing priorities of the nation that 
policymakers represent, lack of momentum, and the law’s rigidity. 
A. The Existing International Framework 
How have international policymakers failed to act?  It is not fair to say that 
international policymakers have not acted at all.  However, the action they have 
taken has lacked momentum.  In 1992, countries joined the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in an attempt to address 
 
9. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007). 
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climate change through international treaty law.10  The UNFCCC’s aim is 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”11  
The UNFCCC provided for “[f]irst steps to a safer future,”12 which included 
recognizing the problem and setting a specific goal to reduce emissions to such a 
level that ecosystems could naturally adapt to climate change without threatening 
food systems or hindering sustainable economic development.13  Developed 
countries, which have contributed the most to emissions, were to “lead the way” by 
reducing their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, and report regularly on 
their measures.14  In addition, developed countries agreed to provide financial 
support to sustainable climate change activities in developing countries and 
recognize their need for economic development.15 
Although the UNFCCC appeared to be a crucial, positive first step toward 
combating the effects of climate change, the results have been less than 
momentous.  “By 1995, countries realized that emission reductions provisions in 
the Convention [UNFCCC] were inadequate.  They launched negotiations to 
strengthen the global response to climate change, and, two years later, adopted the 
Kyoto Protocol.”16  In 1997, 160 nations convened in Kyoto, Japan to discuss how 
the world could quickly build momentum on the issue.  At the convention, then 
U.S. Vice-President and environmentalist, Al Gore, highlighted the problems with 
international policymaking by identifying the “Spirit of Kyoto,” through which he 
intended to “heal the divisions among us” and “bridge our differences.”17  With this 
spirit, he hoped that momentum would be built, and that binding emissions limits, 
new markets, new technologies, and new ideas would create new hope, followed by 
other steps to reach the ultimate goal of a safe concentration level of greenhouse 
gases in the Earth’s atmosphere.18  Adopted in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol committed 
 
10. Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items 
/6031.php (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter UNFCCC Background: The international 
response]. 
11. Background on the UNFCCC: First steps to a safer future: Introducing The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2013).  
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. UNFCCC Background: The international response, supra note 10. 
17. Al Gore, Remarks at the Kyoto Climate Change Conference (1997), in THE GLOBAL WARMING 
READER: A CENTURY OF WRITING ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 127, 130 (Bill McKibben ed., 2011). 
18. Id. at 129. 
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developed nations to meet emission reduction targets based on the UNFCCC.19  
Despite the well-intentioned spirit, the Kyoto Protocol is an emblem of the flaws 
of a global regime.  First, the changing politics of changing world leaders has 
hindered progress.  Despite Mr. Gore’s committed statement that “the United 
States is prepared to act—and will act,”20 the subsequent presidential 
administration of George W. Bush did not ratify the agreement.21  Second, many 
countries have struggled to meet targets as the first commitment period concluded 
in 2012, and “some key developed country emitters like Canada, Japan, and 
Russia—all of which were crucial to the treaty being able to enter into force 
without U.S. participation—have not agreed to specific commitments for the 
second period.”22   
As the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period came to a close on December 31, 
2012, deep divisions existed between nations over whether to continue the two-
track system, where developed countries have binding emissions targets and 
developing countries do not, or to implement a one-track system where all major 
emitters have binding targets.23  Negotiations continued at the 18th meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP18) to the UNFCCC in Doha, Qatar.24  COP18 
resulted in at least three outcomes: (1) a second commitment period under the 
“Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol,” which runs from January 1, 2013 to 
December 31, 2020 (although without the U.S., Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and 
Russia); (2) a promise of USD 100 billion from developed countries to developing 
countries through a finance mechanism from 2020 onward (but nothing between 
the years 2013-2010); and (3) an agreement to discuss an international mechanism 
to account for loss and damage, i.e., “compensations to vulnerable communities for 
the loss and damage caused by climate change” (but only to discuss the possibility 
of such a mechanism).25 
Reactions to these outcomes were at best lukewarm, and at worst scathing.  For 
example, Connie Hedegaard, the E.U. climate chief from 2010 to 2014, stated:  
 
19. UNFCCC Background: The international response, supra note 10. 
20. Gore, supra note 17, at 131. 
21. Associated Press, Bush: Kyoto treaty would have hurt economy: President condemns climate 
change treaty, dependence on Middle East oil, POLITICS ON NBCNEWS.COM (June 30, 2005, 
4:50:11  
PM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8422343/ns/politics/t/bush-kyoto-treaty-would-have-hurt-
economy/#.UMJm7XeO7KY. 
22. HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY 67 (2012). 
23. Id. at 88. 
24. UNFCCC Background: The international response, supra note 10. 
25. COP18: Outcomes of the Doha climate talks, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T AND DEV., 
http://www.iied.org/cop18-outcomes-doha-climate-talks (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
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In Doha we crossed the bridge from the old climate regime to the 
new system . . . .  It was not an easy and comfortable ride.  It was 
not a very fast ride either . . . .  Very intense negotiations lie ahead 
of us.  What we need now is more ambition and speed.26  
While NGO leaders, such as Kumi Naidoo, executive director of Greenpeace 
International, warned  “The politicians and negotiators have lost touch with 
climate reality—sadly their failure will be paid for in lives and livelihoods.”27  The 
21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) and the 11th session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol28 (CMP11) is scheduled for November 30 to December 11, 2015 in Paris, 
France.29  Expectations are high for “negotiators to agree on an ambitious, science-
based climate deal.”30  
B. The Lack of a National Framework 
In the United States, federal policymakers have made minimal attempts at 
addressing climate change.  Notwithstanding this inaction, climate change is one 
of the nation’s most pressing environmental, economic, and social problems of the 
century.31  President Barack Obama’s administration has identified itself as 
having taken “unprecedented action to . . . tackle the issue of climate change, and 
protect our environment”32 and as having “made the largest clean energy 
investment in American history.”33  Indeed, these “unprecedented” responses seem 
appropriate since the United States’ carbon emissions amount to approximately 
twenty percent of the world’s total emissions.34  China has only recently surpassed 
 
26. Fiona Harvey, Doha climate gateway: the reaction, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2012, 10:56 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/dec/10/doha-climate-gateway-reaction. 
27. Id. 
28. Conference of the Parties servicing as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ 
bodies/body/6397.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
29. Calendar, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/unfccc_ calendar/items/2655.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
30. Aline Robert, COP 21 negotiations kick off in Geneva, EURACTIV.COM (Feb. 2, 2015, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/cop-21-negotiations-kick-geneva-311948 
(quoting Samantha Smith, leader of WWF's Global Climate and Energy Initiative) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
31. Cinnamon Carlane, Notes From a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts at 
Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1352 (2008).  
32. Climate Change, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/climate-change#energy-
menu (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
33. Id. 
34. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
(EPA), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html#four (last visited Oct. 18, 
2013). 
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the United States as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.35  
Similar to international policymakers, U.S. federal lawmakers face problems of 
competing priorities, lack of momentum, and the rigidity of the existing legal 
structure.  Despite national attention to the issue, former U.S. president George W. 
Bush’s decision to back out of the Kyoto Protocol reflects the overarching 
difficulties that top-down policymakers face in addressing this unprecedented 
global problem.  While recognizing that the United States is a major emitter of 
carbon, Mr. Bush stated that the targets in the Kyoto agreement would “have a 
negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases for 
consumers.”36  In addition to this competing economic priority, he further 
emphasized a “wait and see approach,” stating that the United States would adjust 
“[its] approaches as science advances and technology evolves.”37  Additional 
problems that top-down policymakers face are the uncertainty of science and the 
disbelief that some in the United States harbor about climate change. 
To date, the United States lacks comprehensive climate change legislation, and 
there is no specific statute that addresses climate change.  Federal regulation that 
does exist has been shaped by slow-moving litigation.38  In the landmark decision 
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the Clean Air 
Act’s broad definition of air pollutant applied to greenhouse gas emissions.39  In 
holding that it did,40 the Court provided the potential for federal policymakers to 
implement new climate change regulation.  However, Congress has not “added 
substantially to the very limited legislation directly addressing climate change, 
other than through investing in clean energy through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.”41  This failure to act when given the opportunity to do 
so is another example of a lack of momentum. 
Until recently, President Barack Obama did not move quickly on the issue of 
climate change.  While recognizing that the issue is a real problem and that the 
United States is obligated to do something about it, he stated that he “think[s] the 
American people right now have been so focused, and will continue to be focused on 
our economy and jobs and growth, that if the message is somehow we’re going to 
 
35. Id. 
36. David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 
12, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/12/world/bush-will-continue-to-oppose-kyoto-pact-on-
global-warming.html? pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
37. Id. 
38. OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 22, at 117. 
39. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
40. Id. at 532 (stating that “[b]ecause greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious 
definition of ‘air pollutant,’ we hold that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate the emission 
of such gases from new motor vehicles”). 
41. OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 22, at 117. 
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ignore jobs and growth simply to address climate change, I don’t think anybody is 
going to go for that.  I won’t go for that.”42  These comments are an echo of a 
previous administration, which exemplify competing priorities, and again, a lack of 
momentum. 
However, on June 25, 2013, President Obama announced the United States’ 
Climate Action Plan, a policy initiative focusing on cutting domestic carbon 
pollution, preparing the U.S. for the impacts of climate change, and taking an 
international leadership role.43  And, in a historic move on November 11, 2014, the 
United States made a joint announcement with China to set targets to reduce 
carbon pollution.44  Although progress appears to be happening, it remains to be 
seen how these developments will evolve, as some politicians “have already 
denounced [President Obama’s] domestic climate change policies as ‘job-killing’ 
regulations.”45 
Comments on competing priorities reflect key reasons why local efforts have 
emerged from the bottom-up.  The fact is that people are focused on climate change 
despite competing priorities, such as the economy and job-growth.  And despite the 
law’s rigidity, state-level and municipal-level actors are enacting legislation in the 
face of legal hurdles.  Moreover, individual actors are building momentum through 
grassroots campaigns.  In the next section, I provide examples of bottom-up 
policymaking successes as a background to the emergence of transnational 
networks. 
II. While We Have Been Waiting: The Success of Bottom-Up 
Climate Change Policies 
A. Climate Change Policy at the State-Level: California 
Even though climate change is a global problem, state policymakers have 
recognized that a safe climate system is a priority within their jurisdiction.  In 
response to the lack of federal regulation, the progressive state of California has 
 
42. John M. Broder, Obama on Climate Policy: Not Just Now, Thanks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2012, 
11:07 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/obama-on-climate-policy-not-just-now-
thanks/. 
43. Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-climate-
action-plan. 
44. Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-
sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c. 
45. Coral Davenport and Mark Landler, U.S. to Give $3 Billion to Climate Fund to Help Poor Nations, 
and Spur Rich Ones, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/us/politics 
/obama-climate-change-fund-3-billion-announcement.html. 
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taken climate change into its own hands.  In 2006, the California Legislature 
passed, and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed, AB 32, the Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006.46  This law established a comprehensive program to fight 
climate change by reducing all greenhouse gas emissions statewide and improving 
energy efficiency.47  Very much like the Kyoto Protocol, the program endeavors to 
reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.48  To this end, the program utilizes a cap-
and-trade emissions mechanism.49  
The fact that California has become a pioneer and a leader in emissions 
reductions should come as no surprise since the state, if seen as a separate 
country, is one of the top emitters in the world.50  Yet, AB 32 is not without 
criticism.  One scholar stated:  
[T]he resort to state-level action is understandable, and perhaps 
predictable, given the U.S. government’s decisions (so far) not to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol and not to enact federal legislation 
regulating GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions.  It is nonetheless well 
understood that these state-level efforts, even those of large states 
such as California, will have little impact on global emissions and 
hence little impact on global climate.51   
However, this scholar also recognized the positive contributions that state-level 
action could yield, including technological innovation, alternative policy 
experimentation, and motivation for industry to support federal regulation.52  
Despite the criticism, California’s AB 32 is momentous because it is the first 
program of its kind in the United States.  AB 32 “shows the world that Americans 
recognize our responsibility to reduce global warming emissions and are finding 
ways to fight global warming at local and regional levels.”53  In addition, by leading 
the way, state-level policymakers serve to shift the normative trajectory of 
lawmaking and loosen its rigidity.  In this respect, bottom-up policymakers are “a 
critical part of a larger-scale conversation”54 on climate change. 
 
46. Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD 
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.html. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. GREGORY FREEMAN ET AL., THE AB 32 CHALLENGE: REDUCING CALIFORNIA’S GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 2 (Jan. 2008), 
available at http://www.laedc.org/ reports/TheAB32Challenge.pdf. 
51. Wiener, supra note 9, at 1963. 
52. Id. 
53. California Passes Landmark Global Warming Bill, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/ action/progress/california-passes-ab32.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) 
(archived webpage accessed at http://www.archive-org-2012.com/org/u/2012-10-10_406195_35/ 
Scientists-Urge-Senators-to-Restore-Scientific-Integrity-Union-of-Concerned-Scientists/). 
54. Osofsky & Levit, supra note 8, at 433. 
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B. Climate Change Policy at the Local Level: Cities 
While it may seem appropriate for California to enact climate change legislation 
given the state’s size, it appears less appropriate for cities to take action due to the 
arguably small effect their actions would have.  However, this argument cannot 
stand if one considers that cities (and towns) are on the frontline of climate change.  
For example, one scholar stated that “[g]iven the presence of over 89,000 local 
governments, most of which own and operate buildings, use vehicles, and maintain 
extensive indoor and outdoor lighting structures, among other things, the potential 
emissions reductions from increased energy efficiency is at least worth 
evaluating.”55   
Local leaders have recognized the importance of cities and have taken action to 
fight climate change.  On the date that the Kyoto Protocol became law, Seattle 
Mayor Greg Nickels launched the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Center initiative 
to advance the goals of the Kyoto Protocol “through [cities’] actions ranging from 
anti-sprawl land-use policies to urban forest restoration projects to public 
information campaigns.”56  To motivate cities, the organization recognizes cities’ 
climate change programs with “Best Practices” awards.57  The following are 
examples of two cities’ emissions reduction programs, which highlight local 
policymaking pioneers. 
In 2009, the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Center awarded Denver, Colorado 
the “First-Place Award for a Large City” for its FasTraks Program.58  FasTraks is a 
transit program aimed at expanding and connecting smart-growth housing choices 
with light rail, park and rides, transit stations, expanded bus service, and 
redevelopment.59  The program is innovative because it “includes an 
unprecedented concentration of transit-oriented development [TOD] opportunities 
[with 51 of the 57 new stations region-wide having TOD potential], making this 
initiative a national model of regional cooperation.”60  
In 2009, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania was the “First Place Small City Winner” 
for its Efficient Energy Service Program.61  This program, through a city-wide 
 
55. Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional 
Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 694 (2010). 
56. U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS CLIMATE 
PROTECTION CENTER (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm. 
57. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER, TAKING LOCAL ACTION: MAYORS 
AND CLIMATE PROTECTION BEST PRACTICES (June 2009), available at http://www.usmayors.org/ 
pressreleases/uploads/Climate BestPractices061209.pdf [hereinafter TAKING LOCAL ACTION]. The 
data for year 2009 is the most recent data available. 
58. Id. at 5. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 6. 
61. Id. at 7. 
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review of operating costs, aims to reduce carbon emissions by making energy 
improvements, including compact fluorescent lamps in city buildings, the 
replacement of lighting in the city’s public square and in all public parking 
structures, and the replacement of all traffic signalization lamps with LED 
lamps.62  This city’s program is unique in that it has improved the quality of life for 
its residents.63  According to its Mayor, “[t]he City of Wilkes-Barre was a 
community that was thriving during the early 1900’s anthracite period in history.  
Many residents’ great grandparents, grandparents and relatives were coal miners 
and made a comfortable living during the era when ‘coal was king.’”64  Now, the 
city’s successes are serving as a model for other municipalities.  
How can local policies and programs make any difference on a global scale?  
“From a policy perspective, ignoring local governments’ collective capacity to 
reduce emissions may cause the state and federal governments to overlook ways to 
facilitate proven and sometimes quick reductions that can be accomplished with 
existing technology and established local bureaucracies.”65  Examples of local policy 
efforts set the stage for transnational networks to combat climate change.  
Networks stitch together the efforts of policymakers, organizations, and individual 
grassroots actors, broadening their reach beyond their jurisdictions to achieve 
global scale.  With a deeper understanding of these strengths in mind, the next 
section addresses the critics’ legitimate skepticism of local efforts on climate 
change, and by implication, transnational networks.  
III. In Defense of a Global Regime: The Limits of Bottom-Up 
Climate Change Policies 
Local efforts to combat climate change face several limitations.  Because 
networks are comprised of local actors, transnational networks must be able to 
address these limitations as well.  The first challenge is the problem of scale—the 
idea that a global problem requires a global solution.  Intermeshed within this first 
difficulty are economic and political issues, which are mainly summarized as a 
“normative debate about whether, in the absence of a climate treaty, major sources 
 
62. Id. 
63. TAKING LOCAL ACTION, supra note 57, at 8 (stating that “during the past 10 years there has 
tremendous community revitalization and economic growth in the City of Wilkes-Barre” and that 
the “city believes [that] by taking on important public projects, such as [its] efficient energy 
service program, it can be the catalyst to encourage other businesses and communities to do the 
same”). 
64. Id. 
65. Trisolini, supra note 55, at 693. 
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have a duty to reduce their carbon emissions.”66  The second challenge is the 
existing legal framework within which local actors are situated.  This section 
broadly addresses both sets of challenges. 
A. The Normative Debate: Economic and Political Problems 
“Think globally, act globally”67 remains the strongest argument against local 
efforts to combat climate change.  This notion originates in economic theory, rooted 
in the idea that “local action is not well suited to regulating mobile global conduct 
yielding a global externality.”68  Scholars who pose this concern argue legitimately 
that “unilateral actions can have little impact on the problem, and so it makes 
sense to await a treaty rather than put in place expensive but unhelpful 
regulations.”69  Basically, policymakers face the undeniable problem of cost.  
Moreover, critics argue that local efforts can lead to perverse results.  These 
undesirable results occur in the form of “leakage” of emissions, where carbon 
“source activities in regulated areas ‘leak’ to unregulated areas over time.”70  
Leakage operates in three ways: through (1) a price effect; (2) a “slack off” effect; 
and (3) a capital relocation effect.  A brief explanation of these three modes of 
leakage follows.   
In the first leakage scenario—the price effect—one jurisdiction begins to 
regulate emissions, for example, by implementing forest protection regulation.  
This action lowers prices in the global market, which in turn, increases the 
demand for the carbon-emitting product in another jurisdiction that does not 
regulate emissions.71  The emissions that would have occurred in the first 
jurisdiction now occur in the unregulated jurisdiction, leaking from, for example, 
Country A to Country B.72  Thus, the first jurisdiction’s attempt to fight climate 
change is negated by the leakage of emissions through the price effect.   
The second scenario—the “slack off” effect—is conceptualized by the idea of the 
“free-rider.”73  If one jurisdiction restricts its emissions, contributing to an overall 
 
66. Farber, supra note 2, at 361 (citing Joakim Sandberg, “My Emissions Make No Difference”: 
Climate Change and the Argument from Inconseqentialism, 33 ENVTL. ETHICS 229 (2011) 
(“exploring the ethical arguments in-depth”)). 
67. See Wiener, supra note 9, at 1962-64 (arguing that local actions are undesirable because of 
normative disadvantages, even assuming that forestalling climate change is of the utmost 
importance). 
68. Id. at 1962. 
69. Farber, supra note 2, at 361 (citing ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE 
JUSTICE (2012)). 
70. Wiener, supra note 9, at 1967. 
71. Id. at 1967-68. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 1969. 
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safer climate, another jurisdiction will not have to spend to abate its own 
emissions, since it benefits from the first jurisdiction’s abatement.74  “Hence, as 
some states emit less, other states rationally emit more.”75  As such, the first 
jurisdiction’s attempt at combating climate change is, again, negated by the 
leakage of emissions through the “slack off” effect.   
The third scenario is the capital relocation effect.76  Capital relocation occurs 
when, for example, “restrictions on emissions in Country A induce emissions-
intensive industries to uproot and relocate facilities to unregulated Country B in 
order to produce their products at lower cost and export their products to world 
markets (including back to the regulated country).”77  Thus, the net effect of the 
local regulation is zero reductions in emissions, or perhaps, which some critics fear, 
an increase in emissions in a less regulated jurisdiction.  
The three concepts of leakage illustrate how lack of uniform regulations 
frustrates the global market.  In addition, lack of uniform regulations imposes 
significant costs on jurisdictions and on industries.78  Once again, the problem of 
cost arises for policymakers.   
The general weakness of state collaboration [or local action] in 
environmental policy can be understood in economic terms—
transaction costs to coordinate at regional levels are high, and the 
benefits of doing so have seemed low.  So part of the inquiry is, 
“What is different about climate change?”  Why are transaction 
costs surmountable in climate change policy?79 
In response to critics’ arguments, leakage is indeed a legitimate concern, but 
“the magnitude of leakage is clearly subject to considerable uncertainty.”80  Studies 
are unable to show with certainty to what degree leakage will affect climate 
change.81  Contrary to the critics’ worst fears, leakage could have positive effects, 
for example, by creating a global consensus to regulate emissions, whereby “a 
virtuous cycle could emerge in which emission reduction efforts become contagious 
and mutually reinforcing.”82  Moreover, other positive effects could happen.  First, 
fearing the costs of operating under multiple regulations, leakage could spur 
 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1968. 
76. Wiener, supra note 9, at 1967. 
77. Id. at 1968. 
78. Farber, supra note 2, at 374. 
79. Lesley K. McAllister, Regional Climate Regulation: From State Competition to State 
Collaboration, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 81, 93 (2009). 
80. Farber, supra note 2, at 372. 
81. Id. at 371 (“The IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] has criticized studies 
showing high leakage rates for assuming obtuse policy designs.”). 
82. Id. at 373. 
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industry to support uniform regulation and drive climate change policy.83  Second, 
“early adopters of climate policies provide tests of policy effectiveness and the 
opportunity for learning from policy flaws.”84  Policymakers can learn from the 
experiences of climate change pioneers, thereby reducing the costs and risks of the 
policies they adopt.  Third, “leakage probably does not severely undermine the 
benefits of well-designed mitigation measures, particularly if the effort involves a 
large economy or group of economies.”85  In sum, leakage should not undermine the 
power of transnational networks. 
B. The Legal Challenges: The Plaintiff’s Problem and Preemption 
In addition to economic and political problems, critics of local efforts to combat 
climate change argue that the existing legal framework prevents these efforts from 
being useful, efficient, and effective.86  In their view, local efforts to combat climate 
change are symbolic and not substantive,87 meaning local efforts “persuade the 
public that something is being done without paying the costs of genuine 
mitigation.”88 
In the United States, local actors are faced with several obstacles within the 
legal framework.  First, the judicial system thwarts climate change because 
bringing an action against a carbon emitter is very difficult.  A plaintiff who has 
been harmed by the effects of climate change is up against considerable challenges.  
The plaintiff must establish standing, “fend off preemption by the Clean Air Act, 
establish the elements of negligence, deflect the political question doctrine, and 
find a remedy for future injuries that the court will be willing to award.”89  The 
second challenge the legal framework presents is existing laws.  For example, if 
policymakers at the state-level decide to regulate emissions, they face challenges 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Dormant Treaty Clause, the Interstate 
Compacts Clause, as well as under theories of preemption by federal statutes.90  In 
sum, the legal hurdles are significant. 
Despite these obstacles, critics acquiesce that they can be overcome to an 
extent.91  As previously discussed, California has become a state-level climate 
change pioneer by regulating carbon emissions through AB 32.  Although the state 
 
83. Id. at 374. 
84. Id. at 375. 
85. Id. at 372. 
86. Wiener, supra note 9, at 1963. 
87. Farber, supra note 2, at 360. 
88. Id. at 360-61. 
89. Wiener, supra note 9, at 1964-65. 
90. See id. at 1966-73 (discussing these obstacles in-depth). 
91. Id. 
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has faced legal challenges, the cap-and-trade market has begun and will serve as 
evidence for future policymakers.  Moreover, even critics recognize the positive 
results of bottom-up climate change action, such as technological innovation, 
experimentation with policy design, and “raising the specter of a patchwork of 
inconsistent state regulations as a political gambit to motivate industry to support 
broader federal regulation.”92  These positive developments support the viability of 
transnational networks. 
In contemplating the arguments against local efforts, critics should consider 
what happens if we await a global treaty.  In an unregulated environment, the use 
of fossil fuels will grow, which in turn, will lead to unrestrained carbon emissions.93  
At some point, when the harms become too great to ignore, policymakers will be 
faced with implementing sharper emissions reductions that may not be 
technologically feasible.  Untested mitigation and adaptation efforts become 
extremely risky at a larger scale, increasing the likelihood that they will fail.94  As 
the climate system becomes increasingly unsafe, people become less confident in 
their leaders, and political systems become unstable.  Thus, waiting for a treaty is 
counterproductive when the alternative strategy—transnational networks—is 
available now.  Transnational networks can mitigate critics’ anxieties because, 
through collaboration, networks stitch together local actions so they reach, in scale, 
the global regime that critics desire. As such, transnational networks are a way to 
“think globally, act globally.”95  The next section emphasizes the importance of 
transnational networks by illustrating the rich contributions that existing 
networks have made in the fight for a safe climate system. 
IV. Reaching Scale: The Emergence of Climate Change Networks 
at a Transnational Level 
Why does climate change need networks?  Through a transnational approach, 
local policymakers and individual actors can surmount the hurdle of scale.  In Hari 
M. Osofsky and Janet Koven Levit’s article, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate 
Change Coalitions, the scholars make a “preliminary exposition of bottom-up 
networking.”96  They argue that,  
Greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts are infused with 
inequality and the specific dynamics of place.  To get at this 
problem, we not only need efforts at every scale, but we also have 
 
92. Id. at 1963. 
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13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (2015) 
322 
to be able to put them together.  By focusing on the “bottom” and 
its embeddedness in networks simultaneously, a clearer picture of 
[these] cities as climate regulators emerges.97 
Transnational climate change networks have formed based on common actors, 
interests, experiences, demands, and exigencies.98  They have appeared as more 
formal networks, such as the Climate Action Network, C40, the World Mayors’ 
Council, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.  Networks have also taken the form of 
grassroots organizations, such as the Internet-based activist group 350.org.  
Highlighting the details of some of these networks illustrates why they are an 
important presence in the climate change conversation and solution.   
Networks of local policymakers have achieved global scale and considerable heft.  
For example, the transnational network C40 is a “global network of large cities 
taking action to address climate change by developing and implementing policies 
and programs that generate measurable reductions in both greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate risks.”99  C40 was created in 2005 after former Mayor of 
London Ken Livingstone convened leaders from eighteen megacities “to pursue 
action and cooperation on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”100  C40 is currently 
comprised of 58 cities making up 18 percent of the global GDP.101  The value of this 
network is not only its global scale, but also its mission to “empower cities to 
connect with each other and share technical expertise on best practices.”102  To this 
end, the network provides useful services that maximize a city’s emissions 
reduction efforts, including (1) direct assistance through on-the-ground support 
staff and expert consultative services; (2) peer-to-peer exchange; and (3) research, 
data, knowledge, and communication management services that identify problems 
and successes, and measure the progress of the network.103  In addition, this 
network provides valuable models for smaller cities and localities.  
Leaders are not only networking to share information and services, but are 
coming together to create voluntary agreements to fight climate change.  In 2010, 
more than 138 mayors adopted the Global Cities Covenant on Climate, The Mexico 
City Pact.104  The Mexico City Pact acknowledges that half of the world’s 
 
97. Id. at 434. 
98. Id. at 429. 
99. History of C40, C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP, www.c40.org/history (last visited Mar. 
16, 2015). 
100. Id. 
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102. C40 Cities: Make a Difference, C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP, www.c40.org/cities (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
103. What We Do For Cities, C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP, 
www.c40.org/what_we_do_for_cities (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
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population lives in cities, this number is on the rise, and carbon emissions from 
cities account for more than 70 percent of global emissions.105  Moreover,  
Since our cities are at increased risk of the devastating 
consequences of global climate change, particularly affecting the 
urban poor, many cities around the world, despite limited budgets 
and capacities, are already developing and implementing local 
adaptation strategies to address problems caused by climate 
change, even in the absence of a binding global commitment on 
adaptation.106   
The Mexico City Pact encourages signatories to report commitments, together 
with greenhouse gas inventories and relevant actions, to an international registry, 
the carbonn® Cities Climate Registry (cCCR).107  The signatories’ commitments 
were recognized as exemplary voluntary commitments at Rio+20 in June 2012.108  
The Mexico City Pact is an example of a transnational network producing a 
concrete benefit outside of the traditional international framework.  Furthermore, 
it is valuable because it is committed to “transparency, accountability and 
comparability of local climate action.”109   
Politicians are not the only actors coalescing to achieve global scale.  The 
Climate Action Network International (CAN-International) is “a worldwide 
network of over 700 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in more than 90 
countries, working to promote government and individual action to limit human-
induced climate change to ecologically sustainable levels.”110  CAN-International is 
subdivided into regional networks or “nodes,” for example, CAN-Australia and 
CAN-North Africa, each of which is responsible for its own governance, policy, and 
advocacy within the region.111  The network facilitates flexibility and decision-
making appropriate for the relevant region, while encouraging the sharing of 
information at a global scale.  The value of this network is a singular, concerted 
effort toward the same goal through “coordinated development of NGO strategy”112 
 
world can count on (2010), available at https://unfccc.int/files/conference_programme/application 
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and information sharing. 
In addition to the more formal organizations discussed above, networks of 
“people-power” have emerged.  The international grassroots movement 350.org is 
an Internet-based organization that utilizes “online campaigns, grassroots 
organizing, and mass public actions . . . led from the bottom up by thousands of 
volunteer organizations in over 188 countries.”113  The network takes its name 
from climate scientists’ recommendation for climate safety—the reduction of the 
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere from the current levels of around 400 
parts per million to 350 parts per million.114  To achieve this goal, the network 
provides resources for individuals to campaign, for example, toward fossil fuel 
divestment or against the Keystone Pipeline XL.115  In addition, the network 
provides valuable services, such as hosting Climate Leadership Workshops, 
highlighting the “human face” of the effects of climate change through access to 
online videos from around the world, and providing a forum for like-minded 
individuals to take action.116  The value of this network is its accessibility; through 
its easily and instantly accessible online tools, it provides global-scale education 
and collaboration through “people-powered mobilization.”117 
Transnational networks have contributed to the fight against climate change in 
many valuable ways.  But can networks form a viable response to the problem of 
the global common good?  In order to better understand how transnational 
networks can overcome this issue, the next section delves into social interaction 
theoretical research by respected economic scholars. 
V. In Favor of Transnational Networks: Social Interaction 
Theories 
Climate change is a classic “tragedy of the commons” problem.118  In the context 
of this tragedy, the common good is the global climate system.  Over the past 
 
113. What We Do, 350.ORG, http://350.org/about/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
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century, we have been polluting the common good at unprecedented levels, despite 
our knowledge that we are causing great harm to the climate system.119  As 
previously mentioned, it is difficult to argue that climate change does not require 
global cooperation because of the difficulty of regulating each individual polluter 
around the world.  Thus, “climate change is a collective action problem par 
excellence.”120  However, international cooperation has been impossible so far.  
How can transnational networks transcend the tragedy of the commons? 
Theories of social interaction are useful for explaining why transnational 
networks are part of the successful solution to climate change.  This section first 
explains Mancur Olson’s collective action theory, not only to highlight why 
international governance has failed, but also to explain why it is “equally useful in 
predicting future cooperation.”121  Next, this section briefly introduces Peter Haas’s 
concept of “epistemic communities”122 and discusses how these communities 
mobilize policymakers toward collective action.  Finally, the section introduces 
Elinor Ostrom’s institutional collaboration theory, where group members “in an 
interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing 
joint benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act 
opportunistically.”123  These three theoretical frameworks provide strong bases for 
identifying why transnational networks are a viable response to the global problem 
of climate change. 
A. Collective Action Theory and Epistemic Communities 
In essence, social interaction theories describe how groups operate.  In his work 
The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson dismisses the optimistic presumption 
that individuals with common interests would voluntarily act to further those 
interests.124  Olson defines a group as “a number of individuals with a common 
interest.”125  In the context of climate change, our common interest is a safe climate 
system, or at least one in which humanity can survive.   
What problems do large groups face when they act collectively?  Three major 
factors prevent large groups from undertaking collective action.126  First, in a large 
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group, each individual receives a very small piece of the benefit.127  Second, 
individuals will be unlikely to pay for the cost of the good because they receive very 
little of the benefit.128  Third, for an international group, even if in perfect 
consensus on the benefit, it will be difficult and costly to operate because of its 
size.129  In the context of climate change, the benefit is reduced emissions, the cost 
stems from, inter alia, the implementation of regulations, and the fact that the 
world’s nations are numerous and not in perfect consensus on the benefit.  In sum, 
Olson’s collective action theory sheds light on the problems inherent in 
international policymaking.   
What are collective action theory’s implications for transnational networks?  
Olson’s theory suggests that collective action can occur if an external authority 
imposes a sanction, incentive, or even “[o]ther moral, psychological, or social 
incentives.”130  Moreover, “[g]roups can use negative inducements against those 
individuals not joining in action and give positive inducements or rewards to those 
who do.”131  Other incentives like “prestige, respect, and friendship”132 or 
“ostracism . . . may help push a non-participant to join the group and contribute 
toward achievement of the collective good.”133  In addition, Olson suggests that 
mass media propaganda can also motivate a group to preserve the collective 
good.134  He cautions that these incentives will only work in smaller groups or in a 
larger group of interconnected smaller groups.135   
Under Olson’s collective action theory, the disadvantages of large groups explain 
why a top-down international regime likely will not be effective.  With respect to 
international policymaking and incentives, Olson’s theory holds true since the 
Kyoto Protocol’s compliance mechanism and enforcement branch arguably have 
not provided strong enough negative incentives to facilitate collective action.136  On 
the other hand, Olson’s research supports the reason why smaller groups 
transcend boundaries.  Networks such as C40 and CAN-International are able to 
act collectively because of their ability to function as an external authority for their 
members.  These transnational networks share critical information, such as 
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transparent scientific data on climate change and potential solutions to common 
issues, and create interconnectedness and accountability toward members, which 
act as incentives to preserve the common good.   
Similarly, Peter Haas’s concept of “epistemic communities”137 provides support 
for the success and potential of transnational networks.  Epistemic communities 
are transnational professional networks of diverse experts who ally to share their 
expertise, frame problems for policymakers, and identify potential solutions.138  
These communities provide policymakers with their technical expertise, authority, 
and evidence-based knowledge.  Haas states that epistemic communities are 
groups of “scientists who set the international agenda and [have] directed their 
own states toward support of international efforts and toward the introduction of 
strong pollution control measures at home.”139  According to Haas, “the success of 
epistemic communities . . . can be largely attributed to their ability to increase 
‘governmental learning,’ a process whereby scientists and ecologists informed 
domestic and foreign policy makers about the extent of the problem.”140  Thus, 
because of their inherent transnational nature and their ability to bring evidence-
based knowledge into the policymaking conversation, epistemic communities hold 
a powerful tool that transnational networks can use to their great advantage—the 
tool of information-sharing—one that both Haas and Olson suggest is critical for 
collective action.  
While collective action tools such as incentives and information-sharing work 
well within smaller groups, what are the implications for groups of policymakers 
constrained by the appropriate exercise of their authority on a larger scale?  The 
next section examines Elinor Ostrom’s social interaction theory on institutional 
collaborations, and provides a basis for transnational networks to operate in a safe 
space to avoid the tragedy of the commons. 
B. “Governing the Commons” 
In her work Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action, Elinor Ostrom explores how groups are able to escape the tragedy of the 
commons.141  Her findings assert that a group of individuals can collaborate 
around the challenges of the common good to “adopt coordinated strategies to 
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obtain higher joint benefits or reduce their joint harm.”142  Her argument is based 
on field studies of groups, each of which had either successfully or unsuccessfully 
dealt with its own tragedy of the commons.143  
Ostrom stresses that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to avoiding the tragedy of the 
commons cannot work and advocates for a multi-faceted approach by asserting 
that:  
[Instead of] a single solution to a single problem, I argue that 
many solutions exist to cope with many different problems.  
Instead of presuming that optimal institutional solutions can be 
designed easily and imposed at low cost by external authorities, I 
argue that “getting the institutions right” is a difficult, time-
consuming, conflict-invoking process.144  
Policymakers and transnational networks can learn from Ostrom’s work in 
order “to govern the commons”145 at a global scale.  Although Ostrom’s research is 
specific to collaborations formed around specific places, such as irrigation 
communities in the Philippines and fisheries in Sri Lanka, her theoretical 
framework is not limited to a specific jurisdiction.  Along this line, scholar 
Jonathan Rosenbloom has applied Ostrom’s work to investigate “collaborations 
based on commonalities, including similar issues and challenges, as opposed to 
geographical convenience.”146  He recognized that local governments are on the 
frontline of the difficulties that climate change presents, and yet they are 
constrained by the jurisdictional challenge of not being able to “cause a direct 
impact beyond their borders.”147  Despite this impediment, Rosenbloom argues that 
local governments can “implement efficient and productive strategies to manage 
multi-jurisdictional challenges . . . without departing from existing legal 
paradigms”148 to become part of the successful solution to climate change.  
Ostrom’s theoretical framework supports the need for transnational networks, 
which can experiment with climate change policy, because the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach will not work.  She asserts that effective collaboration requires “reliable 
information about time and place variables as well as a broad repertoire of 
culturally acceptable rules.”149  In addition, Ostrom argues that institutions are an 
intermeshing of public and private actors “rather than existing in isolated 
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worlds.”150  To this end, transnational networks contribute to future effective 
policymaking because the networks provide evidence of policymaking successes 
and failures. 
In sum, social interaction theories from Olson, Haas, and Ostrom illuminate the 
strengths of transnational networks.  From these scholars’ theoretical frameworks, 
criteria for successful collective action emerge, which include “[i]ncentives, 
disincentives, information, leadership, small groups, and iterated diplomatic 
engagement.”151  Indeed, transnational networks have been working because they 
embody these criteria.  Moreover, through these social interaction theories, the 
powers of transnational networks materialize: (1) the motivation to collaborate 
around a common good; (2) information-sharing, accuracy, and accountability; (3) 
laboratories for policy experimentation and risk-taking; and (4) the momentum to 
create effective policies now.  Transnational networks can capitalize on these 
powers to overcome the legitimate criticisms they face.   
VI. Why We Cannot Wait: The Value of Transnational Networks 
Why does the fight against climate change need networks?  This paper has 
aimed to set out the reasons why policymakers should support transnational 
networks as a critical part of the climate change conversation and solution.  
Climate change will affect every nation, and to a degree, every individual on the 
planet.  A bottom-up networking approach harnesses the powers of all actors, 
including political leaders, NGOs, and individuals, and builds intense and much-
needed momentum.  This section identifies the main values and positive 
contributions that transnational networks embody and create. 
First, transnational networks provide an alternative forum for policymakers to 
discuss issues of concern without the pressures or rigidity of traditional 
lawmaking.  The mayors of Denver, Colorado and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 
“have no power to create nation-state consent.  But as mayors around the world 
increasingly communicate and their personal identities become more international, 
have they become part of the elite decision makers?”152  One should deem that they 
have. 
Second, crucial to the conversation, transnational networks provide a direct way 
of sharing information and experiences.  For local policymakers, an organization 
like the U.S. Conference of Mayors provides a forum to share similar experiences.  
A large city in Colorado has many environmental experiences directly relevant to a 
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small city in Pennsylvania, such as transit, housing, waste, and drinking water 
issues.  Similarly, a town in the United States has many of the same 
environmental issues that a town in Mexico faces.  It is clear that international 
and national policymakers have a poor appreciation of this fact based on the lack of 
momentum.  Transnational networks are valuable because they eliminate the 
traditional filter that applies to the top-down approach and they equalize 
information-sharing between entities not traditionally thought of as equals. 
Third, transnational networks create more institutions to deal with climate 
change.  Arguably, if all the planet had was the Kyoto Protocol, the climate system 
would be facing a much more intense danger than it does now.  Transnational 
networks “recognize the multiple components of international lawmaking, but 
particularly emphasize the on-the-ground, smaller-scale details as a critical part of 
a larger-scale conversation and vice versa.”153  In this regard, CAN-International is 
a strong example of NGOs coalescing to build scale and momentum, and is 
channeling the direction of the climate change conversation by driving 
international action.  For example, the network has made the voice of its 700 
participants heard by speaking at the 18th Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC at Doha. 
Fourth, transnational networks function to educate individuals, communities, 
and nations.  Networks educate others not only about their own perspectives on 
climate change and what they do, but they also provide a forum for science 
transparency.  For example, 350.org’s website includes educational resources, 
videos, fact sheets, organizing guides, and project packs to get interested 
individuals on their way to starting a grassroots movement.  Moreover, the 
organization provides an accessible introduction to the science of climate change 
and equalizes the information for all. 
Finally, these values are not the only positive contributions that networks 
make.  Most importantly, transnational networks allow for better climate change 
policy because they are taking action right now and not waiting for a global regime.  
Through their peer-to-peer interactions, transnational networks provide a clearer 
picture about what needs to be done to ensure a safer climate system. 
Conclusion 
We cannot wait for a global climate regime. 
In one lifetime our increasingly interconnected and interdependent 
economic, social, cultural, and political systems have come to place 
pressures on the environment that may cause fundamental 
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changes in the Earth system and move us beyond safe natural 
boundaries.  But the same interconnectedness provides the 
potential for solutions: new ideas can form and spread quickly, 
creating the momentum for the major transformation required for 
a truly sustainable planet.154 
Climate change mitigation has failed to occur at a measurable level.  Adaptation 
efforts will have to happen much more quickly in areas that have contributed the 
least to climate change.  By allowing a space for transnational networks to thrive 
and by valuing these networks as an integral part of the solution to climate 
change, we ensure that climate change policies have, at the very least, a 
wholehearted chance at addressing the failures of the top-down approach that has 
been employed so far.  What have we got to lose?  Transnational networks are a 
viable solution to climate change policy, and the best shot we have.  
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